NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge Diffusion Research Project. Paper 68: Who is Managing Knowledge? The Implications for Knowledge Production and Management of Global Strategic Alliances in Knowledge Dependent Industries by Golich, Vicki L. & Pinelli, Thomas
NASA/DOD Aerospace Knowledge
Diffusion Research Project
Paper Sixty Eight
Who is Managing Knowledge? The Implications for Knowledge
Production and Management of Global Strategic Alliances in
Knowledge-Dependent Industries
Paper presented at the International Studies Association's 39th Annual
Convention, held 17-21 March 1998, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Vicki L. Golich
California State University, San Marcos
San Marcos, Califomia
Thomas E. Pinelli
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Department of Defense
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19990009604 2020-06-15T22:05:06+00:00Z

WHO IS MANAGING KNOWLEDGE ?
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF
GLOBAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN KNOWLEDGE-DEPENDENT INDUSTRIES
by
Vicki L. Golich
Professor of Political Science
California State University San Marcos
333 S. Twin Oaks Valley Rd.
San Marcos, CA 92096-0001
vgolich@csusm.edu
Thomas E. Pinelli
Technology & Distance Learning Officer
NASA Langley Research Center
Mail Code 400
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
t.e.pinelli@larc.nasa.gov
INTRODUCTION
"Knowledge is power." Knowledge is the
foundation upon which researchers build as
they innovate. Innovation lies at the core of a
state's or a firm's ability to survive in a com-
petitive world. Indeed, some economic histo-
rians aver that technological innovation, not
trade, is the engine to economic growth (see,
e.g., Lewis, 1978; Schumpeter, 1994). De-
spite the centrality of knowledge to corporate
success, analysts have only recently shown an
interest in the "knowledge capital" or
"intellectual capital" of the firm, often literally
trying to assign a value to this resource. Sud-
denly knowledge management has become a
topic du jour for the media (Groves, 1998;
Hammonds, Jackson, DeGeorge, & Morris,
1997; Hiltzik, 1997; Plate, 1997), government
agencies (Dalton & Serapio, 1995), and public
and private think tanks (Arquilla & Ronfeldt,
1998), as well as serious scholarship (Pinelli,
Kennedy, Barclay, & Bishop, 1997; Strange,
1988). It was even the subject of the Winter
1996 special issue of the Strategic Manage-
ment Journal (Schendel, 1996).
Knowledge management encompasses
both the creation (production) and the diffu-
sion (transfer and use) of knowledge. The
proliferation of global strategic alliances
(GSAs) in a number of knowledge-dependent
firms has created a new and complex dynamic
interaction among technology, economics,
politics, and culture, that has redefined the
parameters of corporate behavior (Nelson,
1996). The need to adjust to the "relentless
evolution" of the variables shaping the indus-
try has captured the attention of at least two
of the industry's leaders. Mickey Blackwell,
President and Chief Operating Officer of
Lockheed Martin, recently noted that only
those firms which are "most adaptable to
change, ... [not] the strongest, nor the most
intelligent"will survive("TransatlanticMerg-
ers ...," 1997). Similarly, Philip Condit,
Chairmanof The BoeingCompany,observed
that "of the 12 biggest companiesin the
United Statesin 1900,only oneexiststoday.
You fail to innovate,you ... lose" ("Boeing
NearsDecision... ," 1997).Theriseof GSAs
hascomplicatedandelevatedtheneedto un-
derstandhow to manageknowledge.This pa-
per hopesto shedlight on this goal by ex-
ploring two aspectsof the phenomenon:first,
it uses the large commercialaircraft (LCA)
industry to tell the story of how and why
globalstrategicalliancesemerged,proliferated,
and have become essential to knowledge-
dependentfirms; second,it exploresthe im-
plications of GSA production structuresfor
knowledge management,and in particular
for the changing relationships within the
"Golden Triangle"of knowledgecreationand
diffusion--academia,government,and indus-
try. In sodoing, it raisesquestionsaboutwho
will manageknowledgein the 21st century:
Who discovers knowledge?Who funds the
discovery?Who decideswhat to look for and
how it will be used? Who owns the knowl-
edgediscovered?Whocontrolsits diffusion?
GLOBAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES:
ADAPTING TO CHANGE IN THE
AIRCRAFT RD&P ENVIRONMENT
Industri,:s. However, no LCA is built using
only in-house or even only domestic produc-
tion strt-ctures or processes; Boeing and Air-
bus now "compete" to incorporate as many
foreign producers as they can in an effort to
capture market share into the foreseeable fu-
ture. Inieed, policymakers must grapple with
the imp,,_rative for foreign collaboration in the
constant struggle to" ... enhance the competi-
tiveness, production speed, and capacity of
aerospa,:e companies and suppliers ..." (U.S.-
Asian Collaboration ..., 1997). GSAs which
integrate foreign firms into the entire range of
research, development, and production
(RD&P) processes are potentially more fragile
and vulr.erable than firms bounded by national
borders. Various forms of transnational co-
production arrangements in aerospace are as
old as the industry itself (Bluestone, Jordan,
and Suilivan, 1981; Golich, 1991; Golich,
Pinelli, and Barclay, 1997; Stekler, 1965).
These e u'lier structures were easily abrogated
when ccuntries and companies--primarily for
security reasons--retrenched behind national
borders for aircraft RD&P (Lorell, 1980).
Genuine, globally-dispersed strategic alliances,
from which retreat would be more difficult,
first appeared in the 1970s and later prolifer-
ated during the 1980s (Evans, 1993; Hayward,
1986; I,orange and Roos, 1992; Mowery,
1987; IV owery and Rosenberg, 1989).
During the last 30 years, aviation, though
playing an increasingly critical role in national
security and economic vitality, has been
transformed from a fiercely-protected,
domestically-bounded industrial structure to a
chaotic web of mutually dependent and glob-
ally dispersed firms. Still highly competitive,
the number of primes--those manufacturers
responsible for final assembly--has been re-
duced to two in the LCA sector: Boeing
Commercial Airplane Company and Airbus
The globalization of aircraft manufacturing
has cre_:-.ted a set of intriguing problems for
national industrial and trade policies, due to
the corlplex interpenetration of the LCA
sector with the innovation and technology
systems considered crucial for economic
competitiveness and national security. On
one hand, market forces, together with foreign
governments demanding production agree-
ments as a price for market access, generate
centripetal forces in the industry (Golich,
1992). On the other hand, firms and their
governmentscontinueto prize technological
leadershipand the strategic importanceof
commanding"first place" in aeronauticalin-
novation.As Nelson (1993) observesgener-
ally aboutglobaltrendsin technologypolicy,
"there is a tensioncausedby the attemptsof
nationalgovemmentsto form and implement
nationaltechnologypoliciesin a world where
business and technology are increasingly
transnational"(p.18). These tensions are par-
ticularly evident in knowledge-dependent sec-
tors where national strategies have to co-exist
with, if not globalization, then certainly re-
gionalization of industrial and technological
capabilities.
Innovation and adaptation constantly pro-
ceed through a complicated set of dynamic
reciprocal interactions (Golich, 1992, p. 899;
Nelson, 1996, p. 4). What changes is the rela-
tive importance of these variables as each
shifts back and forth from an independent po-
sition effecting change, to a dependent posi-
tion responding to change. For example, al-
though Europeans took an early lead in
technological innovation in aviation, U.S. po-
litical and economic hegemony immediately
following World War II helped its firms domi-
nate the sector; they had access to private and
public finance and intellectual capital which
enabled them to research, develop, produce,
and sell the largest number of the most tech-
nologically sophisticated aircraft. Operating
from this position of power, U.S. firms can-
celed several attempts at co-production ar-
rangements with European companies, trig-
gering a defensive "catch-up" response which
eventually culminated in the creation of the
Airbus Industries consortium (Golich, 1992;
Hayward, 1986; Hochmuth, 1974; Lorell,
1980; Newhouse, 1982). This circumstance
affected the level and style of government in-
tervention in the industry (Hayward and
Golich, 1997; Hochmuth, 1974; Shepherd,
Duchene, and Saunders, 1983). Over time, as
aviation firms and countries gained political
and economic parity, technological change
took center stage; breakthroughs in communi-
cations, computer-aided design (CAD), and
transportation made transboundary, synchro-
nous research and design work possible and
decreased the transaction cost of shipping
critical components long distances. Thus,
Boeing can now design a paperless airplane
with teams drawn from around the world, and
Airbus can ferry mammoth pieces of its air-
craft, built in the United Kingdom, via the
Guppy to final assembly in Toulouse, France.
These technological changes are now influ-
encing politics, economics, and culture by si-
multaneously increasing volatility and inter-
dependence in the global political economy
and by intensifying its consequences for vir-
tually everyone.
Although the dynamic reciprocity among
technology, economics, politics, and culture
are not easily measured in any tangible way
(Nelson, 1996), a careful analysis can reveal
trends, thus helping corporate and government
policymakers choose appropriate strategic
responses. What follows is a brief description
of each of these factors, an assessment of how
each has influenced and may continue to
shape future structures and processes in the
global political economy and aerospace, and
an analysis of why they are likely to lead to a
further proliferation of GSAs in one form or
another.
Technology
Technological advances affect the emer-
gence, proliferation, and permanence of GSAs
in at least five ways. First, technological
innovationsspecifically designedto enhance
aircraft performance--suchas lighter weight
andstrongercompositematerialsor enhanced
digital displays--often havevaluefor a wide
array of both upstreamand downstreamin-
dustries.Aircraft manufacturingis typically a
pioneerdeveloperand user of coretechnolo-
gies,the early useand refinementsof which
help to decreasecosts for other industry sec-
tors(NationalAcademyof Engineering,1988;
Tyson, 1988; U.S. ExecutiveOffice of the
President,Office of Scienceand Technology
Policy, 1985;van Tulder and Junne, 1988).
Its role as a technology innovator and user
contributesto theperceptionof aircraftmanu-
facturingasstrategicto maintaininga healthy
economy. Second,technologicalinnovations
increasethe efficiency and effectivenessof
aircraft operations. They drive down labor
costs;enhancethe flight parametersof speed,
range,and payload capacity; and expedite
solutions to noise and environmentalpollu-
tion. Computers,electroniccomponents,and
software--which account for over half the
flyaway cost of largecommercialaircraft--
now navigate,control the engines,and even
changethe shapeof an aircraft's lifting sur-
faces to maximize performance; in aircraft
with "fly-by-wire" systemsthe pilot is more
a systems managerthan a stick-and-rudder
jockey (Tomayko, 1992). By decreasingthe
costsof aircraft use, technological innovations
have increased the value of air transport to
governments and corporations alike. Third,
technological innovations improve aircraft
production and assembly. Computers direct
the milling of parts to create components of
greater precision and consistency than those
made with traditional machine tools. Com-
puters also facilitate the building of very large
parts that are stronger, need less assembly,
and are more precise than smaller units. In the
assembly phase, computers employ lasers to
align systems more precisely than ever before.
Altogether, analysts estimate that this wave
of innovation has shaved between 30 and
40 percent off the cost of airplane production,
amounting to as much as a $15 million reduc-
tion in the cost of building a Boeing 747
(Kaplan, 1997; "Software Aids Crash Stud-
ies," 1997). Lower production costs, of
course, yield lower prices and help to increase
sales (Majumdar, 1987).
These three technological advances compel
government policymakers around the world to
gain or maintain a solid position in some key
aspect of aircraft manufacturing. The per-
ceived value of substantial participation inten-
sifies national and corporate intentions to be
players in the sector, and "acts as a centrifugal
force impelling protectionist policies designed
to avoid perceived vulnerabilities associated
with mutual dependency" (Golich, 1992,
p. 902). Several governments have con-
sciously adopted intervention policies de-
signed to promote the unilateral dominance of
the sector--from the United Kingdom's
"magic circle" procurement policies to
France's creation of national champions ra-
tionalized by geographic region--and all have
failed to achieve that goal (Cerny, 1980;
Chapman, 1991; Chesnais, 1993; Cohen,
1977; Cohen, Halimi, and Zysman, 1986;
Crosslard, 1975; Gillispie, 1980; Gilpin,
1968; Golich, 1991; Hayward, 1983;
Hochmuth, 1974; Hoffmann, et al., 1963;
Kolodziej, 1987; Kuisel, 1981; McCormick,
1987; Papon, 1975; Rubenstein, et al., 1977;
Underhiq, 1997; Zysman, 1978).
The_" have been more successful in
acquirin_: a participatory role as a member
of a GSA, in part because of the nature
of the tourth and fifth phenomena in avia-
tion's tc,chnological innovation. Fourth, the
increasingrange,specialization,and sophisti-
cationof aviation technologiesrendersit vir-
tually impossiblefor anyonefirm to maintain
in-houseRD&P of all that is requiredto as-
semblea state-of-the-artaircraft. Hence,sec-
ond- and third-tier subcontractors,vendors,
and suppliers are niche players in aircraft
RD&P (seeFigure 1). Thispyramidstructure
of the aircraft manufacturingindustry first
emergedduringWorld War II to expeditethe
mass production of military aircraft
(Bemstein,1995;Bright, 1978;Golich,Pinelli,
andBarclay,1997;Lilley, 1947);the arrange-
ment facilitated and reinforced subsequent
movestoward "outsourcing" for increasingly
specializedcomponents. Finally, technologi-
cal innovationin researchanddesigncommu-
nicationshasencouragedthe proliferation of
GSAs. Advancesin computeraidedgraphics
and design (CAD) technologies,specifically
CATIA (computer-aided,three-dimensional,
interactive application), enabledBoeing to
producethe 777 using its now fabledcross-
functional design-buildteams (DBTs) from
aroundthe world. Thesenew computerlink-
agesand applicationsfacilitate greateragility
in aircraftRD&P andallow the primesto in-
tegratea largernumber of foreign suppliers
into their production chain. In the caseof
Boeing's777, nearly 60 foreignfirms--from
Japan, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France,
Ireland, Italy, Korea, and Singapore---
supplied components. More than 238
DBTs--somewith asmanyas40members--
joined forces to create the 777 (Mecham,
1997b;Proctor, 1994a). During the design
phase, computers can check whether two
parts will fit togethersnugly, eliminatingthe
needfor buildingphysicalmodelsout of plas-
tic or clay;savingsin time andmoney amount
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Figure 1. The Large Commercial Aircraft Production Structure in the United States.
to roughly 40 percent; computers can also
conduct stress analyses and check the airflow
over a plane before any parts are even ordered
(Kaplan, 1997). This new production flexi-
bility decreases the cost and price of aircraft.
Perhaps most importantly, however, this
wave of technological innovation reinforces
the value of global strategic alliances by mak-
ing them technologically feasible and economi-
cally affordable. Without the ability to com-
municate effectively across vast expanses of
land and sea, these relatively new corporate
structures are rather fragile constructs (Evans,
1993; Lorange and Roos, 1992; Talalay,
Farrands, and Tooze, 1997; van Tulder and
Junne, 1988). They are vulnerable to defeat
by enduring political barriers, economic com-
petition, and cultural differences.
Economics
Just as technological advances generate
equally powerful, but offsetting, motives for
government and corporate behavior--pushing
global players closer together through various
synergies, but also pulling them apart as they
seek to reap associated benefits unilaterally--
the economic realities of aircraft manufactur-
ing in today's global political economy also
exert both centrifugal and centripetal forces.
Aircraft manufacturing can yield extraordinary
benefits--both direct and indirect--for a
country with a successful sector residing
within its borders. Profits from sales, argua-
bly the most direct benefit of all, generate fi-
nancial capital that can be used to support
new generation production projects, and ex-
ports contribute positively to the balance of
trade. Since the late 1950s, aerospace has
been the leading industrial contributor to U.S.
export earnings. At the dawn of the 21 st cen-
tury, aerospace remains the nation's leading
exporter of manufactured goods, producing
the largest trade surplus of any U.S. manufac-
turing industry. In 1997, U.S. aerospace sales
recorded a trade surplus of $34 billion
(Napier, 1998).
Indirect benefits are significant as well.
The industry's key position as a developer
and first user of core technologies has already
been noted. Aerospace also plays an impor-
tant role in creating jobs and as a supplier to
and user of upstream and downstream indus-
tries. According to a study by the Congres-
sional Research Service, for every $1 billion
of aircraft shipments by U.S. finns in 1991,
nearly 35,000 jobs were created (Cantor,
1992). In 1997, U.S. aerospace finns em-
ployed nearly 870,000 persons----of which
43 percent were skilled production workers,
22 percent were engineers and scientists, and
7percent were technicians (Napier, 1998;
1995)--thus helping to sustain a skilled work-
force capable of generating the core technolo-
gies so important to successes in a wide range
of other industries. The aircraft used in
air traasportation constitute a critical
"intermediate" good; any business that de-
pends on air transport benefits from increased
efficiencies afforded by state-of-the-art
equipment. In addition, aircraft production is
connected in some significant way to nearly
80 percent of the economy. Directly or indi-
rectly, agout 340 sectors of the economy, out
of abou! 429 defined sectors, produce goods
and services that support aircraft RD&P; 150
of those supply outputs directly to the air-
craft industry (Cantor, 1992, p. 43). "Thus
the 'linkage externality' is positive--both the
private returns to aerospace manufacturers
and the social and private returns to upstream
and dov, nstream users are increasing" (Golich,
Pinelli, _md Barclay, 1997, p. 5).
Naturally, theUnited Stateshopesto con-
tinue the economicgainsit hasenjoyedfrom
aerospaceover the years. However, other
governmentshave observedthis largesseac-
cruing to the U.S. and have decided they
would like a shareof the benefits as well.
Other industrialized nations in Europe and
Asia, which oncehad thriving aerospacein-
dustriesof their own, seekto reestablishthat
foundation either through competition, as
with Airbus Industriesin Europe,or through
strategic linkages, such as those between
Japanesefirms and Boeing (Barclay and
Pinelli, 1997;Hayward,1986;Pinelli,Barclay,
andKotler, 1997;Samuels,1994;Samuelsand
Whipple, 1989a;1989b). Industrializingna-
tions seekto join the party throughvarious
co-production or sub-contracting arrange-
ments(Harr, 1972;Schaufele,1988).
Whereasaircraftmanufacturing'shugepo-
tential for returninga wide rangeof economic
benefitsfor domesticand regionaleconomies
explainswhy so many nationshope to join
forceswith well-establishedaerospacefirms
in someform of a globalstrategicalliance,it
does not explain why dominant firms are
willing to partnerwith weakerfirms in foreign
countries. Two economicphenomenaunique
to the lastquarterof the 20thcenturycombine
to accountfor this puzzle. The first is simply
that the largestmarket potential for aircraft
lies outsidethe bordersof eitherthe United
Statesor continentalEurope.ThePacific Rim
and Latin America have,by far, the largest
demandfor aircraft into theforeseeablefuture.
This clearlygivesthemthe ability to bargain
for co-productionarrangementsaspart of the
purchasingagreement(Harr, 1972;Schaufele,
1988).
The secondeconomicphenomenonhas
beenthetransformationof aircraftproduction
into an extremelyrisky business financially,
where the stakes are very high. Aircraft
manufacturers make major capital investment
decisions despite uncertain future payoffs.
They spend several billion dollars to concep-
tualize, develop, and build a new generation
airframe. However, the typical 10- to 15-year
return on investment cycle defies accurate
prediction. As a result, new aircraft may not
fit market needs, as happened after the 1978
economic deregulation of the U.S. airline in-
dustry, when manufacturers were caught in
the middle of producing wide body aircraft
that airlines no longer wanted. Despite the
high risk associated with long lead times and
major capital outlay, timing has been critical
to the market success of a new aircraft. Not
only has it been important to get a final prod-
uct to market first, it has also been critical that
aircraft be delivered to airlines on time
(Bluestone, Jordan, and Sullivan, 1981;
Golich, 1989, 1992; Hayward, 1983, 1986;
Miller and Sawers, 1968; Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1982; 1989; Newhouse, 1982).
Performance, training and maintenance costs,
and price far outweigh other factors in today's
market; nevertheless, Boeing was still con-
cerned enough about timing that one of its ar-
ticulated goals for the B-777 was to avoid the
delivery delays and initial service problems
that have accompanied the introduction of vir-
tually every other new generation aircraft
(Majumdar, 1987; Proctor, 1994a; 1994b).
By the 1980s, key corporate and govern-
ment decision makers around the world
concluded that technological advances and
economic dynamics rendered transnational
collaboration critical to maintaining a competi-
tive position. Through collaboration they se-
cured financial support for RD&P, avoided
potential tariff and non-tariff barriers, sought
to nullify or dilute competition from other
finns, and avoided domestic antitrust restric-
tions. Global strategic alliances would also
help prime manufacturers improve market ac-
cess, increase risk sharing, lower RD&P costs,
and gain financial support for sales.
Politics
Politics play an intriguing and important
role in the creation and maintenance of
aviation GSAs. Both domestic and foreign
politics--each influenced by multiple
constituencies--contribute to the number and
shape of aviation GSAs. As soon as the mili-
tary value of aircraft was recognized, their
manufacture became a vital component of na-
tional security; thus, government policies be-
came essential to the sector's development.
Aviation remains a keystone of the military
industrial base. Moreover, it is now also re-
garded as an economic linchpin, highly valued
for its "spillover" effects, either as a powerful
force pushing innovation through a cascade of
"downstream" activities, or as a "first user" of
novel technologies. Although harder to meas-
ure or quantify, aircraft manufacturing brings
an element of prestige to countries around the
world which can afford to participate in the
industry; as such it contributes to a country's
"international status and predominance in the
future development of science and technol-
ogy" (Todd and Simpson, 1985, p. 33). The
drive to attain and sustain military superior-
ity, economic competitiveness, and prestige
has consistently compelled national govem-
ments to support RD&P efforts in aviation.
Typically this has involved a combination of
protection against foreign competition and of
domestic-level promotion (Bluestone, Jordan,
and Sullivan, 1981; Cohen, 1994; Council on
Competitiveness, 1994; Davies, 1964;
Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow, 1989; Golich,
1989; 1992; Golich, Pinelli, and Barclay,
1997; Julius, 1990; Lopez and Yager, 1987;
National Academy of Engineering, 1987; Nau,
1974; Neuman, 1984; Newhouse, 1982;
Rapkin and Strand, 1995; Ruggie, 1975;
Servan-Schreiber, 1968; Simonson, 1968;
Solberg, 1979; Strange, 1988; Tyson, 1988;
1992; van Tulder and Junne, 1988; Vander
Meulen, 1991; Williams, 1984; Yoffie, 1993).
Governments can choose from a wide ar-
ray of policies to promote aviation, including
financial subsidies, information dissemination,
government mandated technology transfer
from foreign sources, technical standards, and
government procurement (Golich, Pinelli, and
Barclay, 1997; Mowery, 1994). Public poli-
cies-the outcomes of politics--can be di-
rected at aircraft manufacturers. For example,
in 1967, U.S. government officials were wor-
ried about the health and well-being of two
then-cote aerospace finns--McDonnell Air-
craft and Douglas Aircraft Company. In-
spired by domestic anxieties about losing
competitiveness, jobs, and a key production
and knowledge base, as well as by interna-
tional apprehensions about continued defense-
oriented production, U.S. policymakers
support_:d the merger of McDonnell and
Douglas by waiving antitrust concerns and
providing a $75 million guaranteed loan; only
four years later a similar set of motives in-
spired a $250 million loan guarantee to pre-
vent Lockheed from declaring bankruptcy
(Golich, 1989; Mowery and Rosenberg,
1982).
Hov_ever, most public policies which af-
fect aircraft manufacturers address concerns
largely, if not completely, unrelated to avia-
tion. Public policy establishes the market
parameters within which economic activity
takes place. A range of policies--including
immigration, intellectual property rights and
patent laws, currency valuation, and trade
liberalization_efines critical economic,edu-
cation,andlegalinfrastructures(Ergas,1987,
p. 92). For example,a strong dollar, which
the U.S. "enjoyed" throughout the 1980s,
providedfinancialcapital for researchandde-
velopment as foreign and domestic capital
sought investment opportunities in the United
States. However, a strong currency can make
exports noncompetitive in price, and has con-
tributed significantly to the rise of aviation
GSAs as firms have sought to counter-balance
the "costs" of a strong currency with produc-
tion participation by potential foreign
consumers.
Although all governments with a robust
aircraft manufacturing sector have been ac-
tively and intimately involved in aviation's
development, this is where the similarity
ends. Governments have adopted different
styles of intervention. Some of this difference
is attributable to politics and some to culture;
in each case the differences have influenced
the number and shape of aviation GSAs. U.S.
aeronautical leadership was obtained by close
cooperation between state and industry, fol-
lowing a "mission oriented" strategy charac-
terized by large-scale project work, centering
on large firms with a heavy emphasis on areas
such as defense. Extensive federal support for
production, transfer, and use of aeronautical
knowledge and technology began in 1917 un-
der the auspices of the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It was
later strongly influenced by extensive Cold
War military procurement and defense-related
research and development (R&D), and man-
aged by NACA's 1958 replacement, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA). The strategy worked, largely
due to the range, scale, and overlap of early
U.S. civil and military "missions," and to the
flexibility of U.S. organizational structures
(Ergas, 1987).
For the most part, European governments
have been motivated to intervene in aviation
for economic, social, and political prestige
purposes; national security as a "mission" has
been less of a concern. They have employed
general and selective subsidies to promote
both generic R&D activities and specific proj-
ects such as the creation and maintenance of
Airbus Industries. European governments
have encouraged collaboration and rationaliza-
tion fairly aggressively among domestic firms
so as to spread investment risk more
widely--across society as a whole---because
the benefits deriving from these activities usu-
ally diffuse quickly throughout other industry
sectors, thereby benefiting society as a whole,
but creating something of a disincentive for
individual firms unable to profit from their
work. They also hope to discourage competi-
tive and duplicative R&D and to boost returns
to scale in R&D by increasing firm size
(Ftlster, 1991, pp. 26-30; Eden and Molot,
1996; Golich, 1996; Kudrle, 1996; Moore,
1996; Rapkin and Strand, 1996; Rothwell and
Zegveld, 1981). In addition, Europeans, con-
cerned about their status in the global econ-
omy, especially vis-h-vis the U.S., launched
an aggressive series of industrial and technol-
ogy policies in 1968 designed to sustain or
reinvigorate their competitiveness. Embedded
in these strategies was a recognition that tran-
snational collaboration would be necessary,
and governments actively encouraged firms to
cooperate across formerly impenetrable po-
litical borders (Nueno and Oosterveld, 1986;
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 1968; Scherer, 1992; Servan-
Schreiber, 1968).
As with the United States and Europe,
Japan has implemented a variety of policies--
foreignand domestic--aimedat both generic
R&D activitiesandspecificsectors,including
aircraft manufacturing. Unlike the national
policies of the United States and Europe,
Japanesepublic policy appearsto be more
coherentandcoordinated,targetingclearly ar-
ticulated,thoughbroadlybased,goals. It is
groundedin theassumptionthat technological
leadershipiscritical to nationaleconomicper-
formance and to Japan's ability to remain
competitive in today's global political econ-
omy. Closely identified with survivability,
Japan'spublic policy is focused,consistent,
pragmatic,adaptive,and designedto increase
corporatecapacity to adjust to technological
changeacrossentire industry structures via
theeffectivediffusion of importedanddomes-
tically produced knowledgeand technology
(Branscomb,1993;Ergas,1987;Frankel and
Kahler, 1993;He, 1993;Imai, 1991;Komiya,
Okuno,andSuzumura,1988;Pinelli,Barclay,
andKotler, 1997). So,for example,education
policy, which includesa mandatorysix years
of pre-collegeEnglishtraining,dovetailswith
industrialpolicy becauseit ensuresthat Japa-
neseadultscanlearnfrom anddiffuse the ex-
plicit or codified knowledge contained in
books,journals,anddrawings,aswell asfrom
the experientialor tacit (learn-by-doing/leam-
by-using) knowledgegainedby working with
engineers,scientists,andtechnicianstrainedin
the U.S. and by studying abroad (Arrison,
Bergsten,Graham,and Harris, 1992; Imai,
1991;MoweryandRosenberg,1985b;Odagiri
and Goto, 1993; Okimoto, 1986; Peck and
Goto, 1981).
The Ministry of InternationalTrade and
Industry (MITI) is the principal stateplayer
in the Japaneseeconomy (Johnson, 1982;
Samuels,1994). MITI nurturesthe develop-
ment of industriessuchas aircraft manufac-
turing as sourcesof knowledgethat can be
"spun on" to other industries. It fosters re-
search collaborations, alliances, and linkages---
among domestic firms, such as the Japanese
Aircraft Development Corporation (JADC),
as well as with foreign firms, such as the
JADC/Boeing "program partnership," the 777
project--as one way to access and import ex-
ternal knowledge and technology (Cheney and
Grimes, 1991; Pinelli, Barclay, and Kotler,
1997).
Japan has targeted aircraft manufacturing
as one of three key technologies for the 21 st
Century (Todd and Simpson, 1986, p. 209).
Aircraft production complements Japan's
strengths in such areas as materials, micro-
eletronics, and computer-aided design and
manufacturing (CAD/CAM) (Council on
Competitiveness, 1996; Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1985a; National Research Council,
1994; Sabbagh, 1996; Samuels and
Whipple, 1989a; 1989b; Todd and Simpson,
1986; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991; Yoshino, 1986). How-
ever, for Japan to be a "player" in the sector,
policymakers have recognized they must form
strategic partnerships with firms in the U.S.
or in Etrope. Four key reasons underlie this
conclusion:
First, the market, both domestic and
foreign, for military aircraft was rela-
tively small, cyclic, and well estab-
lished. Second, the small size of the
dom:stic (Japanese) market (coupled
with the lack of a mechanism for in-
term_tional sales and a launch cus-
tomer) was insufficient to support
comnercial aircraft production. Third,
the ?d)&P costs are so great that no
one firm (or consortium of Japanese
firms) can assume the risk associated
with launching a new LCA. Fourth,
Japaaese industrial policies, industry
sortia combine to make Japan ideally
structure, and airframe and engine con-
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suitedto participatein joint ventures as
subcontractors and risk-sharing part-
ners with established LCA producers
(e.g., Boeing). (Pinelli, Barclay, and
Kotler, 1997, p. 857)
1996a; 1996b;
1996.)
Culture
Rosenbloom and Spencer,
As with technology and economics, politi-
cal concerns, at both the domestic and the in-
ternational levels, send government officials
mixed signals regarding the wisdom of sup-
porting global strategic alliances. Whereas
technological, economic, and political gains
associated with aerospace suggest policymak-
ers should do all they can to protect an inde-
pendent, self-sufficient, domestic industry,
global technological, economic, and political
realities, such as greater parity and competi-
tiveness across the board, compel policymak-
ers to embrace GSAs. As Gibbons, et al.
(1996) note however, the specialized knowl-
edge firms need to create competitive advan-
tage is difficult for all firms to acquire or imi-
tate; it is particularly difficult for those "firms
whose national culture does not yet support a
well articulated science and technology infra-
structure" (p. 13). This is borne out by
Figure 2, which reveals the U.S. technology
position relative to Japan and Europe. Those
firms have done well whose governments have
been proactively involved in the economy--in
particular, those nations where education, sci-
ence and technology, and competition policy
are integrated into "a comprehensive innova-
tion policy that is sensitive to the fact that
knowledge production is socially distributed"
(p. 16). (For more on some of the issues con-
fronting knowledge diffusion "policy" in the
United States, see Chapman, 1995; Dye,
The impact of culture as a variable affect-
ing something as technical as the engineering
and science associated with commercial class
aircraft manufacturing surprises only those
who have not been involved in trying to merge
corporate cultures or to negotiate outsourcing
arrangements with foreign companies, much
less the terms and conditions associated with
a global strategic alliance. Culture influences
the shape and number of GSAs at both the
firm and the national (or society) level.
At the most fundamental level, culture
shapes a society's economic ideology. Cul-
ture helps to define the acceptable and appro-
priate relationships between the state and the
market (Strange, 1988). For example, United
States policymakers often confuse economic
liberalism with an assumption that the gov-
ernment should never intervene in the econ-
omy. This defies a very long tradition in the
U.S., dating back to the very beginnings of our
nation, of significant government involvement
in the economy (Golich, Pinelli, and Barclay,
1997). In some countries, e.g., France, poli-
cymakers choose to directly involve them-
selves in the economy. (For more on the ef-
fect of history, ideology, and culture on
national approaches to innovation policy, see
Brander, 1987; Cerny, 1980; Chandler, 1977;
Chandler and Daems, 1980; Chapman, 1991;
Chesnais, 1993; Gillispie, 1980; Gilpin 1968;
Golich, 1992; Hoffmann, et al., 1963; Keck,
1993; Markovits, 1986; McCormick, 1987;
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Sector Parity Lead
Slight
Energy
Energy efficiency • •
Storaqe, conditioning, distribution, & transmission [] •
Improved generation [] •
Environmental quality
Monitoring & assessment • V
Pollution control • []
Remediation & restoration V •
Information & communication
Components • el
Communications [] •
Computing Systems • []
Information management •
Intelligent complex adaptive systems [] V
Sensors • •
Software • •
Living systems
Biotechnology [] •
Medical technologies • •
Agricultural & food technologies • &
Human systems
Manufacturing
Discrete product manufacturing • []
Continuous materials processing • •
Micro/manofabrication and machining • []
Materials
Materials • [] •
Structures []
Transportation
Aerodynamics [] •
Avionics & controls V •
Propulsion & power • •
Systems integration [] •
Human interface • •
Source: European Commission (1996) National Critical Techno ogies Review Groups
Japan Europe
• Improved • Improved
• Maintained [] Maintained
• Declined • Declined
Substantial
Figure 2. US Technology Position Relative to Japan & Europe.
Porter, 1990; Talalay, Farrands, and Tooze,
1997; Underhill, 1997.)
Culture also affects styles of communica-
tion and negotiation that can facilitate or com-
plicate problem solving (Gray and Wood,
1991). Comfort levels with the time it takes
to find the common ground which might lead
more easily to dispute-resolution vary across
cultures. This becomes absolutely critical
when the time comes to negotiate strategic
alliances that transcend political borders. By
their very nature strategic alliances are inten-
tionally created to last, otherwise firms could
pursue the far simpler task of negotiating a
time-certain contracting arrangement. Strate-
gic alliances, however, involve the sharing of
key factors of production, including financial,
human, and intellectual capital, and therefore
can onl) endure if a long-term horizon is con-
sidered. During the course of a strategic alli-
ance, pa rtners will contribute to and withdraw
from th,_ various resource pools unevenly at
any given point of time, but in a balanced
fashion over the long haul. Therefore, signifi-
cant tru:;t that the benefits will, in fact, accrue
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equitably must be in place for the alliance to
be successful. Cultural differences regarding
what is fair or appropriate to give and to take
can, therefore, play very important roles in
negotiating the final structures and processes
involved in GSAs (Gray, 89; Gray and
Wood, 1991; Harris and Mowery, 1990;
Hoffman and Kaplinsky, 1988; Imai, 1991;
Katzenstein, 1976; Koenig and van Wijk,
1992; Kohn, 1992; Lawler, 1985; Money and
Haufler, 1992; Mytelka, 1987; Perlmutter and
Heenan, 1986; Pravitt, 1990; Rorlich, 1987;
Spekman and Wilson, 1992).
At the level of the firm, corporate culture
defines how the work of the firm gets done
(Gray, 1989; Kohn, 1992) and affects atti-
tudes toward corporate rivalry and collabora-
tion (including between domestic and interna-
tional corporations), international copyright
and patent law, and the priority of task orien-
tation and hierarchy versus process orienta-
tion and consensus. Management of key re-
sources, e.g., financial, human, and intellectual
capital, is also embedded in corporate culture.
For example, though economists have long
cited "labor" as a critical production factor,
the value of educated, highly skilled, easily
trained, mobile, and flexible employees, capa-
ble of working across functional boundaries,
has only recently gained attention. Since nei-
ther knowledge nor technology has value
without application, the availability of a
workforce that is capable of taking advantage
of discovery and innovation in either arena is
critical to continued economic success. How
firms value human and intellectual capital are
extremely important in high-technology indus-
tries that are dependent on continuous innova-
tion for their very survival.
Finally, yet another culture resides within
the firm: the culture of innovation: " ... the
time-honored traditions and well-entrenched
cultures that drive the research establishment"
(Berghel, 1996, p. 16). This includes an ele-
ment of "enormous inertia" (Berghel, 1996,
p. 16) as well as a social network of innova-
tion, the formal and informal communications
networks that link the people and institutions
involved in research and production. The so-
cial network of innovation influences both the
speed and the nature of a corporation's recep-
tion to and utilization of external knowledge
and technology, e.g., the perceived value and
consequences of technology transfer (Morris-
Suzuki, 1994). The culture of innovation af-
fects the style or process of research and de-
velopment within a country or society; it
helps to define access to and availability of
the tools of innovation.
National culture--the body of customary
beliefs, social forms, and material traits em-
bedded in the traditions of a country--helps
define corporate structures and processes.
These then affect the shape of global strategic
alliances. For example, in the United States,
early concerns about the consequences of mo-
nopoly led to antitrust legislation that encour-
aged corporations to be self-sufficient and
autonomous; treated as individuals legally,
corporations avoided partnerships with other
firms for fear of the punitive consequences of
"collusion." In contrast, the French govern-
ment actively encouraged and directed the
outcome of industry rationalization, creating
the groupement business structure, a configu-
ration that provided individual companies
autonomy within umbrella organizations that
served essentially as marketing cartels. Mem-
ber firms could preserve their "own fixed
capital, production facilities, research labora-
tories, and administrative services. Each
group created a central bureau to parcel out
orders to member firms, negotiate contracts,
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and search for foreign clients" (Chapman,
1991, p. 37). Thus, the stage was set for col-
laboration in Airbus Industries--initially or-
ganized as a groupement--which provided
perceived guarantees with respect to national
sovereignty as well (Cerny, 1980; Cohen,
1977; Gilpin, 1968; Kreiger, 1987; Kuisel,
1981; Stoffaes, 1986; Thornton, 1995;
Zysman, 1978). And, in Japan, keiretsu--a
group of cooperative, and often subcontract-
ing, firms (Johnson, 1982; Samuels, 1994) and
a descendant of similar, but much more tightly
connected groups of finns, known as
zaibatsu--have a well-established tradition of
long-term, semi-fixed relationships between
users and suppliers and among affiliated firms,
subcontractors, vendors, and others
CYoshimura and Anderson, 1997). The grou-
pement and the keiretsu industrial organiza-
tions are beginning to replace the previously
dominant "multinational corporation" struc-
ture. This structure derived from the United
States' early dominance of international in-
vestment--a dominance in which a large busi-
ness enterprise, headquartered in one country,
participated in wholly-owned, direct foreign
investment in other countries. Groupement
and keiretsu are replacing the traditional mul-
tinational corporation precisely because of the
increased national and corporate protections
which accrue to all participants as a result.
National culture can also influence the
structural and procedural outcomes of GSAs.
Whereas economics, technological innovation,
and politics all have elements which promote
the creation of GSAs, culture is likely to be
the factor most resistant to GSAs. In the end,
however, the first three factors clearly have
overwhelmed the latter. As a result, culture's
role in affecting GSAs lies primarily in its
capacity to define styles of interaction and
communication.
THE RISKY BUSINESS OF
PREDICTION
The business of predicting change is risky
at best, particularly in the case of aircraft
manufacturing. Manufacturers understand
that it is important to bring a differentiated
product--with the performance parameters
and costs airlines both need and can afford--
to the market in a timely fashion. The ex-
traordinary costs of RD&P, as well as the in-
credibly long cycles associated with both
product gestation and return on investment,
combine to make it very difficult to predict
future market demand beyond a one- to two-
year period (National Academy of Sciences,
1998). Effective forecasters must not only be
cognizant of the complicated set of factors
described above; they must also realize that
these factors do not trigger change in a linear,
unidirectional, or independent fashion.
Rather, they converge in a dynamic and recip-
rocal reationship such that changes in each
mold changes--both predictable and
unpredictable--in others in a never ending
process of intersection and adaptation (Basic
Research White Paper, 1997; Golich, 1992;
Nelson, 1996; Port and Carey, 1997). So it is
with some fear and trepidation that the
authors assert that, in the foreseeable future,
these factors will continue to make a case for
global strategic alliances.
Global Strategic Alliances--Part Un
To ,late, the emergence and proliferation
of global strategic alliances in aircraft manufac-
turing represent responses to two distinct
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change phases. During the first phase--
roughly 1950 to 1990_strategic alliances
were a response to the need for critical mass
in aircraft RD&P.' Technological advances in
aircraft were relentless, and as they increased
the potential rewards to be derived from avia-
tion, they also increased costs and risks.
Larger and more complicated aircraft required
longer lead times between gestation,
production, and revenue eaming. Attempting
to incorporate increasingly sophisticated
technology--e.g., the jet engine---into aircraft
design and production precipitated a dramatic
rise in RD&P costs which simultaneously in-
creased uncertainty about future payoffs and
decreased the ability of a single manufacturer
to finance an aircraft development program
(Golich, 1989; 1992; Hayward, 1983; 1986;
Majumdar, 1987; Miller and Sawers, 1968;
Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982). New indus-
try dynamics made it "more difficult, and cer-
tainly more expensive for a firm missing out
on one generation of aircraft to challenge for
success in the next" (Hayward, 1983, p. 1).
Once Boeing launched the B-707, followed
within a year by the Douglas DC-8, other
American manufacturers lost so much market
share that they virtually vanished from the
scene. As Boeing dominance grew, the weak-
ening position of Douglas Aircraft Company
triggered its 1967 merger with McDonnell
Aircraft discussed above (Mowery and
Rosenberg, 1982, p. 111).
During this time period, several other key
factors altered the market for aircraft RD&P.
Governmental budget cuts, the spiraling cost
of raising capital, sharp increases in the price
of jet fuel, and increasing demands for envi-
ronmental and noise regulations added signifi-
'This section relies heavily on Golich, Pinelli,
and Barclay, 1997, especially pp. 13-22.
cant costs to an already expensive RD&P cy-
cle, while reducing access to financial capital.
Subcontracting for components and systems
was adopted as a strategy to reduce the cost
and risks associated with introducing new
generation aircraft. Initially limited to domes-
tic sources, subcontracting was eventually ex-
tended to foreign firms (Hochmuth, 1974;
Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982, p. 116; Rae,
1968, p. 83).
These changes were reinforced by sys-
temic transformation of the LCA sector:
Greater perceived (and real) interdependencies
among trading and production partners, in-
creased importance of aviation markets out-
side the U.S., surplus capacity of aircraft, and
growing subcontractor and vendor demands
for more extensive participation in RD&P
proliferated early in the decade. The potential
value of aircraft manufacturing triggered com-
petition in a global market with a shrinking
customer base--25 major air carriers ac-
counted for more than 70 percent of the world
travel market, with approximately 67 percent
of the large commercial aircraft market located
outside the U.S. (Clarkson, 1992; Taneja,
1994). This competition was intensified
by the existence of surplus capacity in all
commercial aircraft market segments
(Kelly, Oneal, DeGeorge, and Vogel, 1991,
pp. 84-85; Lopez and Yager, 1987, p. 5), a
phenomenon aggravated, perhaps ironically,
by technological progress that increased
the potential life span of aircraft from 25
to 50 years and lengthened the replacement
cycle.
By 1980, policymakers were concerned
that denying market access might propel po-
tential partners to become future competitors
(National Academy of Engineering, 1985,
pp. 63-64). In the end, corporate executives
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decidedthat collaborationwith foreign part-
ners was critical to maintaining a competitive
position in aircraft manufacturing. They did
so to secure financial capital, avoid potential
tariff barriers, neutralize competitors, and cir-
cumvent legal restrictions. Manufacturers
also sought expanded market access; greater
levels of risk sharing; reduced research, devel-
opment, and production costs; and sales sup-
port. Collaboration was also encouraged by
the fact that so many aircraft purchases were
now linked to industrial offsets (Hayward,
1986, pp. 31, 94-95; see also Bluestone,
Jordan, and Sullivan, 1981, pp. 159-160;
Harr, 1972; Schaufele, 1988).
Global Strategic Alliances--Part Deux
During the second cycle--beginning in the
1990s and extending into the 21 st century--
GSAs are likely to reflect a response to more
recently acknowledged characteristics of the
global market. Advances in communications
and transportation systems have dramati-
cally increased the tendencies toward interde-
pendence. Advances in production and design
technologies---e.g., CAD/CAM capabilities--
render global RD&P economically and
technologically feasible, though still vulnerable
to political and cultural obstacles. The com-
bination of economic and technological
imperatives seems to be more compelling than
the political and cultural impediments in
place.
As we move into the next millennium,
GSAs are likely to intensify further. Already,
no large commercial aircraft is launched with-
out careful attention to choosing production
partners from around the world. The global
arrangements include direct investment,
co-production, licensing arrangements, and
collaborative efforts in the research, develop-
ment, production, and marketing of the
aircraft. U.S. firms build Airbus aircraft com-
ponents; fn'rns from Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, The Neth-
erlands, Singapore, Spain, the United King-
dom, and the former Yugoslavia help build
Boeing aircraft.
For example, the Boeing Company has
cautiously expanded its conventional subcon-
tracting arrangements with foreign finns.
Boeing first increased its purchases of parts
made by outside suppliers with the aim of
reducing the in-house content of its transports
from 52 percent to 48 percent ("Boeing to
increase ... ," 1995, p. 33). Figure 3 depicts
this shift in contracting strategy. Then, Boe-
ing expanded the number of its international
suppliers and created tighter linkages among
some program participants. With the B-767,
Boeing :naugurated its first program with non-
U.S. risk-sharing participants--Japan' s
Commercial Airplane Company, a consortium
of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, and Fuji Heavy Industries,
furnished about 15 percent of the airframe,
while Ialy's Aeritalia contributed another
15perc¢_nt. Japanese representatives held
membership status on the executive council
and prol,,ram committee and were referred to
as "Program committee and were referred to
as "Pn_gram Participants"--a transitional
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737and 757Airplanes
Ba Make
Buy
D Landing Gear & Build-Up
BB Section 41
D Doors- All
BB Major Assembly
Engines
BB Constant Section Fuselagl
lib
BB Nacelles
BIB Struts
Wing Fixed Leading/TrailingEdges
IN Wing Center Section
BB Wings
Wires*
BB Engine/Strut Build-Up*
D Control Surfaces --
BB Wires*
D Interiors- Labor Intensive*
BB Interiors - Capital Intensive*
Cargo-Handling Systems, Hardware & Software*
BB Constant Section Fuselage Assembly*
D Section 48
Metal Stabilizers
Tier II & III Composites, Nonstructural*
*Not shown in illustration.
**777 only;747 and 767 metal stabilizers are buys,
747, 767 and 777Airplanes
BB Make
D Buy
-- _ LandingGear & Build-Up
BB Section 41
Engines
BB Major Assembly
Constant Section Fuselage Panels
Doors - All
n Nacelles
BB Wing Center Section
n Struts
Wing Fixed Leading/Trailing Edges
Wings
BB Wires*
ControlSurfaces*
BB Engine/Strut Build-Up*
D Cargo-Handling Systems,
Hardware & Software*
BB Interiors - Capital Intensive*
Interiors - Labor Intensive*
BB Constant Section Fuselage Assembly*
Section 48
-- BIB Composite Stabilizers**
D Tier U& III Composites, Nonstructural*
Figure 3. A Comparative View of Components Made or Bought for Boeing
Large Commercial Aircraft.
arrangement between a conventional subcon-
tract and a full partner role. With the RD&P
of the B-777, Boeing moved further in the
direction of institutionalizing its GSAs. Al-
though program management and control re-
sides with Boeing, the degree of communica-
tion and integration in the "working together"
teams is unprecedented, as exemplified by the
data system designed to integrate engine, air-
frame, and airline maintenance needs; it is so
interconnected that airlines can "access the
enginemaker's blueprints" (Proctor, 1994b,
p. 54; Cole, 1995). The Japanese, who con-
tributed 20 percent to the program, were able
to review its status, progress, and outlook and
to influence some design and development de-
cisions early in the process. In return, they
accepted significant risk participation, as-
suming responsibility for both the non-
recurring and recurring costs of the hardware
items they produced (Benke, 1987).
Two other trends are likely to prevail
through the next several decades. First,
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consolidationamongthesecond-andthird-tier
vendorswill accelerateasthey seek to con-
cludelong-termsupplier agreementswith the
two remainingprimes,whilealsotrying to cut
costs and to specialize (Morrocco, 1997,
p. 24; Rossant, 1997, p. 64). Second,the
primes will further rationalize production, by
spinning off non-core sectors while seeking
new applications for the core technologies in
which they excel, e.g., information technolo-
gies. "Managing data to work cheaper and
more efficiently has become a prerequisite to
winning contracts" (Mecham, 1997a, p. 46).
Aircrafl manufacturing is rapidly becoming an
information processing industry, which de-
pends on computers to show engineers how
to organize production lines and build aircraft,
and on artificial intelligence to improve line
maintenance of aircraft fleets, to enhance flight
simulation and debriefing systems, and to re-
construct and analyze accidents (Mecham,
1997a; 1997b; Lavitt, 1997; Proctor, 1997).
IMPLICATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT
The radical changes, which have impelled
governments and firms to negotiate GSAs to
produce goods and services, have also affected
the way knowledge is produced and used.
Once the purview of university scholarship,
knowledge creation has spread to a variety of
public and private institutions. Knowledge,
however, is only a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for market success. Only
when it leads to a marketable technological
innovation does knowledge have value for the
firm. Increasingly, finns depend on special-
ized knowledge to provide a continuously re-
plenishable source of created comparative ad-
vantage. However, it is becoming more and
more difficult for firms to acquire the special-
ized knowledge they need; at the same time, it
is frequently too expensive for individual
firms to support the requisite R&D entirely
in-house. Therefore, "firms have become
involved in a complex array of collaborative
arrangements involving universities, govern-
ments, and other firms, sometimes from
within the same sector" (Gibbons, et al., 1996,
p. 13). Knowledge has been transformed into
a commodity; as such it has value--as if it
were a _angible asset--and its acquisition and
use must be managed.
As firms and countries move toward con-
solidating and rationalizing their corporate
connections, one key indicator of the potential
for GSAs to be a long term trend is the fact
that these relationships increasingly include
shared work at the most fundamental levels of
science, research, and development. Because
innovation and discovery--areas where ad-
vances can give early users significant com-
petitive advantage--most frequently occur at
the R&D stages, the willingness to share is
noteworthy (Gross, Carey, and Weber, 1994;
Pinelli, Barclay, and Kotler, 1997). In what
might be considered an ironic twist, the pur-
suit of knowledge may actually contribute to
the lon_;evity of GSAs. Before companies
move into the realm of collaborative R&D
they will most likely have been partnered for
some time in the manufacture of a product and
will ha,ve negotiated many of the pre-existing
corporate cultural differences. With mutual
benefits of collaboration proven, joint R&D
become:; a logical extension and the knowledge
created becomes jointly proprietary. Each
partner recognizes that the firms benefit
most--jointly and individually--from contin-
ued collaboration; this dictates against abuse
of the innovations discovered (Berghel, 1996).
Moreover, as we enter the 21 st century,
firms ar_ increasingly dependent on ever more
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specializedknowledgeasthey seekto create
comparativeadvantageby producing goods
which are qualitatively discreetand superior
to others on the market.However, the most
valuableknowledgeis difficult to imitate or
usebecauseit is tacit, rather than explicit, in
nature. Explicit knowledge is transmittable in
formal, systematic language; it can be ex-
pressed in words and numbers but represents
only the tip of the iceberg of the entire body
of possible knowledge (Nonaka, 1994).
Explicit knowledge is captured and maintained
in libraries, archives, and databases. By con-
trast, tacit knowledge resides within the indi-
vidual (Ambrosini, 1995; Collins, 1982; Sobol
and Lei, 1994; Spender, 1993; Teece, 1986;
1981; von Hippel, 1994; 1987; Wagner,
1987). It is this personal quality that makes
tacit knowledge extremely difficult to formal-
ize and communicate. Tacit knowledge is of-
ten embodied in " ... a set of rules which are
not known as such to the person following
them" (Polanyi, 1962, p. 49). Since the per-
son does not "know" the rules s/he employs
to accomplish a task, s/he could not provide a
useful explanation of the rules. Tacit skills
may be teachable, but only through demon-
stration, observation, and practice (Stiglitz,
1987; Winter, 1987). Therefore, the special-
ized knowledge which firms need is seldom
"readily available to be bought or sold off the
shelf, like other commodities" (Gibbons, et al.,
1996, p. 13). (See Alic et. al., 1992;
Branscomb, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Pinelli, Kennedy, Barclay, and Bishop, 1997;
and Polanyi, 1962; 1976, for additional dis-
cussion of the role and significance of tacit
knowledge.)
The increasing demand for knowledge has
been at least partially responsible for the pro-
liferation of knowledge suppliers. Research-
ers in industry and government laboratories,
think-tanks, research institutions, and consul-
tancies partake in the business of knowledge
creation and application through technological
innovation. As the number of knowledge
suppliers has increased, universities have
come under increasing public pressure for
greater accountability and suffered significant
cuts in public financial support. In addition,
the academic technical/science community
confronts a funding crisis that it has not
experienced since 1967-1975 (Brooks and
Randazzese, 1998). Thus, universities--
much like corporations--must form strategic
alliances with government, industry, and other
institutions of higher education; frequently,
these alliances transcend national borders.
According to Gibbons, et al. (1996),
... the parallel expansion in the number
of potential knowledge producers on
the supply side and the expansion of
the requirement of specialist knowledge
on the demand side are creating the
conditions for the emergence of a new
mode of knowledge production. (p. 13)
This new mode of knowledge production does
not replace the more traditional mode.
Instead, the new mode complements, or oper-
ates parallel to, the older model. The tradi-
tional mode of knowledge production is
governed largely by academia and tends to
generate knowledge for its own sake within
narrowly defined disciplinary borders
(Gibbons, et al. 1996); perhaps more impor-
tantly, the traditional mode of knowledge
production has included a commitment to the
open disclosure of research results and equal
access to the derivative knowledge base for all
qualified scholars. The new mode of knowl-
edge production is transdisciplinary, carried
out in a context of application, and heteroge-
neous in creation. But potentially most dis-
concerting is that it includes closer and more
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formal university-industry relationships.
Brooks and Randazzese(1998) note at least
two seriousconcernsfor knowledgeproduc-
tion relatedto this situation. First, thoseob-
servingthis transformationof knowledgepro-
duction andsupplyworry thatan increasingly
"purposeful" pursuit of knowledge,which is
inevitably linked to proven commercialrele-
vance, may underminethe well-established
tradition of open disclosureand equalaccess
to what is essentially a public good--
knowledge.Second,giventheproven success
of thetraditional approachto openandunfet-
teredknowledgecreationunderthe "old" uni-
versity researchsystem,observersworry that
this transformationmay underminethe long-
term ability of university researchersto dis-
coverpurposefulknowledge.
Pursuing "Purposeful" Knowledge
The scholarly pursuit of "purposeful"
knowledge is disquieting for four reasons
(Brooks & Randazzese, 1998, pp. 361-385).
First, though closer university-industry link-
ages hold promise in some arenas, greater de-
pendency on these ties (e.g., for desperately
needed research revenues) carries with it a
more intense emphasis on commercially rele-
vant research. Fundamental (basic) research,
which has long been the purview of university
researchers and for which they are uniquely
qualified, may suffer as a result (Dasgupta &
David, 1994; Geiger, 1993; Rosenberg and
Nelson, 1994). Empirical evidence supports
the otherwise intuitive concern that univer-
sity-industry research arrangements lead to
more applied research being conducted by
faculty (Blumenthal, Causino, Campbell, and
Louis, 1996; Cohen, Florida, and Goe, 1994;
Morgan, Strickland, Kannankutty, and
Grillon, 1994; Rahm, 1995).
Second, though the tighter linkages be-
tween industry and university researchers
may open up some very important research
opportunities which otherwise might have
been too expensive to pursue, there is the
very real potential that universities might
compromise their commitment to open disclo-
sure and equal access to the scholarship of
discovery (Chapman, 1995; Dasgupta &
David, 1994; Dye, 1996a; 1996b; Etzkowitz,
1989; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989;
Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996; U.S. Con-
gress, House of Representatives, 1992).
Again, empirical studies support what other-
wise might be merely intuitive or anecdotal
evidence. Industry views knowledge as pro-
prietary, and is therefore interested in limiting
the disclosure of the results deriving from the
university research it supports. Concerned
researchers have queried this possibility from
a number of directions. Their discoveries in-
clude the following: (a) some 47 percent of
the companies supporting life science research
within universities "occasionally require aca-
demic institutions to protect confidential pro-
prietary information resulting from sponsored
research for longer than is strictly necessary
to file i patent application" or place other
commmtication and publication restrictions as
a condition of financial support; (b) perhaps
even more disturbing, 19.8 percent of the life
science faculty had themselves delayed the
publication of their work, and 8.9 percent had
refused to share research results or materials
with colleagues at least once in the previous
three y_:ars (Brooks and Randazzese, 1998,
p. 378; see also Blumenthal, et al., 1996;
Rahm, 1995).
Third, the constraints placed on knowl-
edge diffusion may also originate with the
university. In their efforts to generate
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revenuethrough the aggressiveassertionof
intellectual property rights, university ad-
ministratorsmay restrict the communication
or publication of researchresults (Abelson,
1994; Brooks and Randazzese, 1998;
Etzkowitz, 1989; Mowery and Rosenberg,
1989;U.S. Congress,House of Representa-
tives, 1992). Eventhoughrelatively few pat-
entableinventionsare anticipated(except in
the fields of molecularbiology andcomputer
science),universitieswant to havethe option
of exploitingprofits from patents;most firms
arewilling to comply with a requestfor li-
censingtheusefulknowledge.
Finally, university researchersmay find
themselvescompromisingthe traditional val-
uesof openresearchanddiscovery,andin so
doing,more willingly accept short-term,re-
strictiveresearchtasksandprojects. Studies
have revealedthat, indeed, the traditional
modelof disinterestedpursuit of knowledge
within the university is beingunderminedby
potentially lucrativeresearchventureswhich
carry with them disseminationrestrictions
(Blumenthal,et al., 1986; 1996; Brooks and
Randazzese, 1998; Morgan, etal., 1993; 1994;
Cohen, Florida, and Goe, 1994; Krimsky,
1997; Krimsky, et al., 1996).
These four concerns are further compli-
cated when overlaid with the globalization of
higher education in general, research efforts in
particular, and increasingly tighter linkages
between universities around the world with
"stateless" corporations. Here the concern is
less with parochial interests regarding the po-
tential negative influence of foreign corporate
research requests. Not only is it unrealistic
and unwise to attempt to nationalize science
as an economic activity, it is also the case that
relatively little research is funded by foreign
firms. Moreover, in those cases where re-
search is externally funded, that research is
typically more long-term in focus. Rather the
questions that arise here are those asked at the
beginning of the paper. What are the implica-
tions for international relations of this new set
of constraints and ownership placed on
knowledge?
Preventing the Erosion of the University
Knowledge Base
To the extent that we continue down the
path of more narrowly defined, corporate-
sponsored, purposeful research, we must ask
what effect this transition may have on the
"old" university research system. Some see
little or no threat (Gibbons, et al., 1996).
Rather they see the new research path oper-
ating next to the older, more traditional one.
Others fear that the new path may overwhelm
the older one, eventually undermining the fun-
damental knowledge base thought to be a core
component of continuous innovation and ad-
vances (Brooks and Randazzese, 1998). This
is particularly troublesome as funding for
higher education continues to shrink in relative
and absolute terms (Astin, 1985; Bok, 1993;
Bowen, 1981; Chapman, 1995; Dye, 1996a;
1996b; Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996;
"Shared Responsibility ... ," 1996). A num-
ber of policy options--with relevance to a
wide array of GSAs across any number of in-
dustry sectors--might be implemented to fa-
cilitate GSA formation and maintenance, while
protecting national constituencies.
First, governments could assume more
proactive roles in promoting the development
of human and intellectual capital in order to
accelerate private sector-based innovation
(Nelson, 1996; see also Basic Research White
Paper, 1997; Carey, 1997, p. 170; Flanigan,
1996, p. D2). Complementary roles for
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governmentwouldbe(a) to encouragecompa-
nies to collaborate(Carey, 1997), (b) to
provide stableandpredictablefunding suffi-
cient to reducethe needfor universities to
submit to potentially damagingconstraintson
knowledge diffusion (Bok, 1993; Brooks
and Randazzese,1998;"SharedResponsibil-
ity ... ," 1996),and(c) to encourage"strategic
research,"that is, researchwhich focuseson
the needsof the corporatesponsorbut has
sufficient technicaland scientific depth to
warrant the interest of the professional re-
searcherin both theuniversityandthe private
sector(Berghel,1996,p. 18).
Second,governmentscanpromoteknowl-
edgediffusion and enhance intellectual capital
by creating or supporting networks of institu-
tions, associations, corporations, research
centers, academics, and other scholars and
professionals to enhance the discovery and
application of knowledge and technology.
Governments could also encourage the crea-
tion of "buffer institutions" to help bridge the
cultural gaps between the academic and corpo-
rate worlds (Brooks and Randazzese, 1998).
Such institutions are fairly common in Europe
and Japan, though less so in the United States.
The Max Planck Institute, the Japanese Air-
craft Development Corporation, and the
NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (operated
by the California Institute of Technology) are
examples of this kind of institution. They
share the following characteristics; (a) they
have both operational and research responsi-
bilities, which translate knowledge into appli-
cation; (b) they are closely connected to uni-
versities but are independently organized and
managed; and (c) they have their own perma-
nent core staff but benefit from the participa-
tion of faculty and students in problem solv-
ing (Brooks, 1970; Brooks and Randazzese,
1998; Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996).
Thiz d, stakeholders need to clarify the pa-
rameters of intellectual property rights pro-
tections. Law generally reflects culture and
codifies extant norms and principles that guide
behavior. Broad patents tend to be exclusion-
ary and to discourage "outsiders" from par-
ticipating in subsequent rounds of innovation
and may, thereby, slow the processes of in-
novation; however, overly narrow patents
may not provide enough incentive to the pri-
vate sector to engage in the very expensive
research and development required to apply
technology to a useful product. Here, moving
toward a multilateral agreement regarding in-
tellectual property rights is a logical, though
evolving, goal. Recognizing that the interna-
tional community of scholars, corporate man-
agers, and policymakers will be fortunate to
approach agreement on what constitutes pro-
tectable, proprietary knowledge and what be-
longs on the "open market," codifying a goal
is likely better than allowing practice to lead
us down a path where the extant norms and
principles provide ownership rights to pub-
licly valuable knowledge (U.S. Congress, Gen-
eral Accounting Office, 1992; U.S. Congress,
House of Representatives, 1992).
In their work on creating a research and
innovation policy that works, Brooks and
Randaz_'ese (1998) remind us of Vannevar
Bush's 'admonition: Science can be effective in
the national welfare only as a member of a
team, whether the conditions be peace or war
(p. 389). It would be wise to remember that
academic science represents only a small frac-
tion of he science and technology needed to
achieve economic competitiveness and pros-
perity. However, it is academic science that
has the greatest potential to provide the con-
ceptual foundations upon which other mem-
bers of the team--in the corporate and gov-
ernmental worlds--can build. The heightened
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needfor basic scienceand basic technology
research,combined with the simultaneous
squeezeonuniversity budgets,calls for a re-
conceptualizationof the placeof the univer-
sity in the knowledgediffusionequation. We
mustidentify newroles for academiandaca-
demic researchersthat will allow them to
deploy their creativity in ways that help in-
dustry innovatewithout compromisingthe
academicvalueswhichhaveservedsociety so
well to date.
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